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EASTLAND v. BURCHELL.
A loan upon mortgage in its nature differs little from any other
loan upon collateral; the mortgagee having and keeping as his
security for the loan the personal responsibility of the borrower,
and the value of the real estate collateral, which he has thought
proper to accept. The way in which this security may be increased
under the New York rule, at every transfer of the encumbered pre-
mises, by the personal responsibility of the purchaser, seems unrea-
sonable: and to allow him without resorting to the premises, a right
of action for the whole debt against any one in the line of title,
independent of the agreements such person may have with his
grantor, seems quite inconsistent with ordinary legal principles.
The more the subject is investigated, the more will the rule com-
mend itself, that the promise of the grantee is directly for the
benefit of his grantor, is merely to indemnify him from the debt,
and gives the mortgagee no rights whatever at law, and only in
equity an opportunity, after a sale of the premises, to avail him-
self of this duty so long as it is owed to the mortgagor, and no
longer. H.G.W.
RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.
Hih Court of Justice; Queen's Bench JiviRion.
EASTLAND v. BURCHELL.
The authority of a wife to pledge the credit of her husband, is not an inherent
but a delegated authority. If she binds him it can only be as his agent.
Where a wife leaves her husband without cause she carries no implied authority
to bind him even for necessaries; but when she is driven away by his fault, he is
bound to maintain her elsewhere, and she becomes of necessity his agent to supply
her wants upon his credit. .In such case only is the question of the adequacy of
an allowance or the suitableness of the goods furnished as necessaries, open to
the jury.
Where, however, husband and wife separate by mutual consent, the terms on which
the separation is made are binding on them so long as it lasts ; and if one of the terms
fixes the amount of the wife's income, she has no authority to pledge herhusband's
credit for necessaries in the event of such income proving insufficient.
THis was an appeal from the Tunbridge County Court on a case
stated for the opinion of the court.
The action was brought by the plaintiff, a butcher, against the
defendants, who were husband and wife, for 381. for meat supplied
to the wife, who at the time was living separate from her husband.
The County Cout t judge gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff
against the husband for the whole amount.
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The husband appealed from this judgment, and on the appeal
raised a question as to the rejection of evidence at the trikl. The
facts relating to this latter point will be found in the judgment.
Fatkin Williams, Q.C., for the appellant.-A wife has no
authority to pledge her husband's credit when separated from him,
such separation being by mutual consent, and arrangements as to
the income of the wife suitable to the position of the parties having
been made: Jolly v. BRess, 15 C. B. N. S. 628. It is for the plain-
tiff to show that agency existed between the husband and wife. As
to the question of evidence, it is clear from Cobbett v. Hudson, 1
E. & B. 11, that a man may be witness and advocate in the same
cause: see note to Alanby v. Scott, 2 Smith's Leading Cases 429.
King8ford for the respondent.-As to the second point, the
judge was right in refusing the evidence of the advocate ; it could
only be hearsay. As to the principal question, when parties sepa-
rate by consent, the question of sufficiency of allowance is for the
jury. If it be not paid or inadequate, the husband is responsible
for necessaries supplied to the wife. This principle runs through
all the decided cases : see Addison on Contracts, 7th ed. 135 ; also
Hodginson v. Fletcher, 4 Camp. 70; Hunt v. De Blaquiere, 5
Bing. 550; Nurse v. Craig, 2 B. & P. N. R. 148; Johnston v.
Sumner, 3 H. & N. 261; Biffin v. Bignell, 7 Id. 877.
The judgment of the court was delivered by
LusH, J.-The questions arising in this appeal are, first, whether
the appellant is liable for butcher's meat supplied to his wife
between the 13th of March and the 3d of October 1877, under the
circumstances stated in the case ; and, secondiy, whether the County
Court judge was right in excluding the evidence of his solicitor, who
tendered himself to prove from his personal knowledge what the
exact income of the appellant was, the ground of rejection being
that the solicitor was acting as advocate for him in the cause, and
that he could only give hearsay evidence.
The appellant and his wife were married in 1850. On the 6th of
January 1876, they separated by mutual consent, the appellant
taking charge of the four elder children, the three younger ones
remaining with his wife. By their marriage settlement all the
property then belonging to the wife, together with the property
which would come to her on the death of her mother, was settled to
lwr separate use. A deed of separation was txecuted by which she
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was to take and enjoy all articles of personal ornament and dress,
and all property and income to which she then was or should there-
after become possessed or entitled, and the savings of all income.
The appellant covenanted to pay to the trustee 51. per quarter so
long as the three children, or any of them, should be under the age
of twenty-one years and continue to reside with her; the wife
covenanted that she would maintain and educate the children out of
her separate income and the 51. per quarter, and not apply to the
appellant for any further pecuniary assistance; and the trustee
covenanted to indemnify him from all debts and liabilities thereafter
to be contracted by the wife.
The parties continued to live separate under this arrangement,
and the appellant had paid the 51. per quarter up to a period sub-
sequent to the accruing of the debt in question. The respondent
had never known the appellant, and had only dealt with the wife
subsequently to the deed of separation. He supplied the goods,
supposing her to be a married woman, but without making any
inquiries in the matter.
The only evidence on which the learned judge acted was that
of the wife (it being admitted that the goods had been supplied), and
she stated that she had been ever since the separation in receipt of
her separate income, which brought in 2971. 15s. 2d. per annum,
and the 201. a year paid by the appellant, and that she found such
income insufficient to enable her to maintain herself and such of
her children as resided with her, and to educate them. The case
states that she also gave evidence as to the position and income of
the defendant prior to her separation, but does not state what that
position and income were.
The learned judge decided upon this evidence that the income of
the wife was insufficient for the maintenance and education of
herself and the children under her care, and thereupon held, as a
matter of law, that she had authority to pledge her husband's credit,
and did pledge it to the respondent in respect of the meat supplied
to her. We are of opinion that this ruling is erroneous. The
authority of a wife to pledge the credit of her husband is a dele-
gated, not an inherent authority. If she binds him, she binds him
only as his agent. This is a well-established doctrine. If she
leaves him without cause and without his consent, she carries no
implied authority with her to maintain herself at his expense.
But if he wrongfully compels her to leave his house, he is bound
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to maintain her elsewhere, and if he makes no adequate provision
for this purpose, she becomes an agent of necessity to supply her
wants upon his credit. In such a case, inasmuch as she is entitled
to a provision suitable to her husband's means, the sufficiency of
any allowance which he makes under these circumstances is neces-
sarily a question for the jury. Where, however, the parties
separate by mutual consent they may make their own terms, and
so long as they continue the separation these terms are binding on
both. Where the terms are, as in this case, that the wife shall
receive a specified income for her maintenance, and shall not apply
to the husband for anything more, how can any authority to claim
more be implied? It is excluded by the express terms of the
arrangement. It is obviously immaterial whether the income is
derived from the wife's separate property, or from the allowance of
the husband, or partly from the one source and partly from the
'other. It is enough that she has a provision which she agrees to
accept as sufficient. She cannot avail herself of her husband's
consent to the separation, which alone justifies her in living apart
from him, and repudiate the conditions upon which that consent
was given. And it seems superfluous to add that no third person
can claim to disturb the arrangement made between the husband
and the wife, and to say that he will, by supplying goods to the
wife on credit, compel the husband to pay more than the wife could
have claimed, that is, the stipulated allowance. He can derive no
authority from the wife which she is incompetent to give. We are,
therefore, of opinion that any inquiry into the husband's means
was irrelevant, and for that reason we abstain from saying more
upon the second question than that, if evidence upon that point had
been relevant, we see no reason why the evidence offered should be
rejected.
We do not think it necessary to go through the various cases
cited. They are no guides to us, except so far as they exhibit the
principles on which the authority of a wife to pledge the credit of
her husband rests. Upon that point they are conclusive to show
that the capacity of a wife to contract debts upon the credit of her
husband is derived from an authority either expressly or impliedly
given by him. We need only refer to the two more recent cases
of Johnston v. Sumner and Biffln v. Bignell.
We are not concerned to inquire whether in. this or that particular
case this principle has been rightly applied. We have only to
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deal with the facts of this case, and applying the principle to them,
we hold that the appellant is not liable for the debt contracted with
the respondent.
Being satisfied that we have all the materials before us necessary
for the determination of the question, it would be a useless expense
to the parties to send the case back for a new trial. We, therefore,
act upon the wholesome provisions of the Judicature Act, 1875,
ord. 40, r. 10, and direct that the judgment for the plaintiff below
be set aside, and judgment be entered for the appellant.
It may not be easy to reconcile all the
decisions upon the subject of a husband's
liability for his wife's contracts. In
some of them the true ground of her
authority-that of agency-may not
have been kept distinctly in view. In-
deed the prevailing custom among legal
authors on contracts to treat the subject
under the head of "11Married Women "1
rather than under "Agency," where it
more properly belongs, may have tended
to mislead the reader as to the true
source of her authority. But recognis-
ing now the doctrine in its fullest extent
that a wife has not ordinarily, as wife,
any original and inherent authority to
charge her husband by her contracts-a
power to endure so long as the relation
endures-but that she can bind him only
as her agent, express or implied-im-
plied in fact, or implied in law-let us,
for convenience sake, consider the sub-
ject in four classes of cases :
1. During cohabitation; 2. When
she has left him through his fault; 3.
When they separate by mutual consent;
4. When she leaves without just cause.
1. During cohabition" And here we
should exclude all those cases where an
implied agency in fact is created, as by
having paid former bills without objec-
tion, or when the husband sees or knows
of the delivery and consumption of the
goods without any disapprobation, or
when in any way he ratifies and con-
firms his wife's purchases--for these cir-
cumstances might create a tacit agency,
whether the purchases were made by a
wifea son,or a servant. They, therefore,
shed no true light upon the question we
are now considering, viz., the extent
of her implied agency in law. And
many of the apparently conflicting cases
on this subject may be reconciled on the
ground that there was evidence of some
tacit agency in fact.
It may therefore be assumed, that
during cohabitation a wife has ordinarily
a primafacie agency to purchase on her
husband's credit, necessary supplies for
herself and the family. This is based
largely upon the fact that it is customary
to intrust a wife with the management of
the household affairs, and to that extent,
tradesmen have a right prima facie to
consider her authorized. The authori-
ties on this point are so uniform as
to render their citation unnecessary.
And see .ewsbury v. Newbold, 26 L. J.
Ex. 247 (1857), not elsewhere reported;
Jolly v. Bees, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 628.
But this agency is limited to articles
that are reasonably necessary for her or
the family, and does not extend to busi-
ness contracts, nor to purchases of ex-
travagant articles for herself or children,
or gifts for her friends. See Lane v.
Ironmonger, 13 M. & W. 367 ; Seaton v.
Benedict, 5 Bing. 28 ; Montague v. Bone.
dict, 3 B. & C. 631 ; Philipson v. Hayter,
Law Rep. 6 C. P. 38; St. John's ParisA
v. Bronson, 40 Conn. 75; Sutter v.
Mustin, 50 Ga. 242.
And the agency to purchase necessa-
ries even, is only prima fade, and may
be disproved by the husband, by show-
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ing that he had abundantly supplied the
house with all things necessary and
suitable ; or that he had furnished his
wife with ample ready money for the
purpose, and requested her not to pur-
chase on credit ; or had provided suit-
able places where all things necessary
could be had, and forbidden her to pur-
chase elsewhere. The husband is still,
in view of the law, the head of the
house; and has a right to control the
affairs of his own household. He has
a right to say when and how his house
shall be supplied, though of course he
cannot repudiate his obligation alto-
gether. But so long as he does his duty
in this particular, there is no duty to be
done for him by another, and therefore
there is no one authorized by law to do
it. The modern cases of Woodward v.
Barnes, 43 Vt. 330; Reid v. Teakie, 13
C. B. 627; Reneaux v. Teakle, Ex.
680; Jolly v. Rees, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 628;
.Hol v. Brien, 4 B. & A. 252; Cromwell
v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. 560; Heriott v.
Bagioli, 9 Bosw. 578; Richardson Y.
Dubois, Law Rep. 5 C. P. 51 ; Kller
v. Phillips, 39 X. Y. 351 ; 40 Barb.
390; Burr v. Armstrong, 56 Mo. 577 ;
Harrison v. Grady, 12 Jur. (N. S.)
140; 14 Weekly Rep. 139 ; Shoolbred v.
Baker, 16 Law T. Rep. (N. S.) 359 ;
Ryan v. Nolan, Irish R. 3 C. L. 319,
fully support these views, though doubt-
less there may be some authority the
other way. . Ruddock v. Marsh, 1 H. &
N. 601, in which the husband was held
liable for necessaries supplied and con-
stmed in his absence, although he had
left sufficient money with his wife for
that purpose, is apparently contrary to
all sound rule on this subject.
2. Where she leaves him through
his fault. Here she carries her implied
agency with her, and has the same
power to supply her own wants on his
credit, as before. Hancock v. Merrick,
10 Cush. 41; Mayhew v. 2'hayer, 8
Gray 172; Reynolds v. ,Sweetser, 15 Id.
78; Emery v. Emery, 1 Y. & J. 501;
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.4ultz v. Gibbs, 66 Penn. St. 360;
Houleston v. Smyth, 3 Bing. 127 ; Brown
v. Ackroyd, 5 El. & BI. 819; Harrison
v. Gr.ady, supra ; Forristall v. Lawson, 34
Law T. Rep. 903 (1876). But if he
still furnishes her abundant means to do
so, without pledging his credit, she has
no right to use the money otherwise,
and purchase on his name. And if the
husband authorizes her to buy at certain
places, where she can be suitably sup-
plied, and forbids her to do so at some
particular place, he has a right to do so,
and is not bound by her contracts at
that place, in violation of his express ord-
ers, when there was no reasonable need
of her so contracting; certainly after
notice of the facts to the party seeking to
charge him. Her whims are not the
criterion of her power, but her needs
only, and he has a right still to dictate
who his creditors shall be, provided
always he does not unreasonably limit
her in her range of choice. See Mott v.
Comstock, 8 Wend. 544; Kemball v.
Keyes, 11 Id. 33; .Mizen v. Pick, 3 IL
& W. 481-; where the husband was
living apart from his wife in adultery,
but allowed and paid her a sufficient
sum for her maintenance, he was held
not liable for her board and lodgings,
though the plaintiff had no notice of the
allowance. But if the allowance he
makes her is inadequate, or if he does
not pay it promptly, she still retains
her agency to purchase on his credit.
Nurse v. Craig, 5 B. & P. 148; Baker
v. Sampson, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 382;
Collier v. Brown, 3 F. & F. 67.
3. When they separate by mutual
consent. And here the case of Eastland
Y. Burchell, no doubt, lays down the
modern English rule. If she has by
articles of separation deliberately agreed
to accept a stated sum in full for her
support, and stipulated not to contract
on her husband's name, she cannot do
so, even though the sum paid proves
inadequate. Her agency is terminated.
She has by her own act abrogated it.
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And though the tradesman who supplies
her is ignorant of the facts, yet he trusts
her at his peril. She cannot give an-
other rights she does not herself pos-
sess. See Mallalien v. Lyon, 1 F. & F.
431.
In Johnston v. Sumner, 3 H. & N.
261 (1858), the defendant and his wife
had separated by mutual consent, and
with the agreement that she should have
2001. a year, for her own use, which she
had been receiving during her marriage
under a covenant from her mother to
that effect. The plaintiff had supplied
her, on her own order, with dresses and
articles of millinery to the amount of
1601., without knowing she was married,
and without making any inquiry about
it, but having afterwards ascertained
the fact, he brought an action against
the husband for it. Upon these facts it
was held there was no evidence to war-
rant a jury in finding for the plaintiff,
and he was nonsuited, which was con-
firmed by the Court of Exchequer, upon
the ground that the question was one of
the wife's authority, that the creditor
must make that out; that to do so, he
must show, if they were living separate
and apart, she was doing so under cir-
cumstances giving her an authority to
pledge his credit, and if she had agreed
to accept an allowance, which was paid,
it was the plaintiff's duty to show such
allowance inadequate, and that not
being shown, there was no evidence to
charge the husband.
In Biffin Y. Bignell, 7 H. & N. 877
(1862), the husband allowed and paid
his wife, as per agreement between
them, twelve shillings a week, and she
boarded with the plaintiff, who claimed
361. for three months' board and lodg-
ing. BRAX'WELL. J., told the jury that
if the defendant's wife was living apart
from him under an agreement by which
she was to receive a weekly allowance,
which was paid, she could have no
authority to pledge his credit, and the
defendant would be entitled to their
verdict. And this ruling was affirmed,
BRAMWELL repeating that even if the
provision was inadequate, the wife would
have no such authority, so long as she
lived apart under such a conditional
assent on the part of the husband, con-
ditional upon the fact that she would
accept the provisions in full of all claim
for support.
It is not clear the American rule goes
quite so far. If the amount so paid is
found adequate to her wants by the
jury, it is clear she has no authority
to go beyond it and purchase on credit.
One of the earliest and best considered
cases in America on this point is Cany
v. Patton, 2 Ashm. 140, which agree with
the English rule laid down in Hodgkinson
v. Fecher, 4 Camp. 70; Holder v. Cope,
2 C. & K. 437 ; Reeve v. Conyngham,
Id. 444; Emmett v. Norton, 8 C. & P.
506 ; where the adequacy of the allow-
ance seems to have been considered
material. And see Fredd v. Eves, 4
Harr. 385.
So it was held in Pidgin v. Cram, 8
N. H. 350, that where they separate by
mutual consent, and the husband makes
a contract with a suitable person, to
support his wife in a suitable manner,
she cannot leave that place without any
just cause and pledge her husband's
credit elsewhere for her support. And
see Stevens v. Story, 43 Vermont 327.
Though some hold that even in such
case, if the wife has sufficient means
of her own, she cannot purchase on her
husband's credit; for if she chooses to
live separate and apart, without his
fault, and by mutual consent, she can
only charge him in case of actual ne-
cessity; and if able, she must pay her
own bills. See Litson v. Brown, 26
Ind. 489 ; Dixon v. Harrell, 8 C. & P.
717; Liddlow v. WtImot, 2 Stark. 86 ;
Clifford v. Layton, Mood. & Mal. 102 ;
3 C. &P. 15.
Of course if he does not promptly pay
the stipulated allowance, she still re-
tains her agency, as before. Beale v.
